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SHAME NOW: RUTH 
LEYS DIAGNOSES 
THE NEW QUEER 
SHAME CULTURE
J. Keith Vincent
From Guilt to Shame: Auschwitz 
and After by Ruth Leys. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2007. Pp. 216. $25.95 paper.
In From Guilt to Shame, Ruth Leys 
follows up on her earlier work on 
the genealogy of trauma studies by 
tracing the emergence and even-
tual discrediting of theories of sur-
vival guilt since the end of World 
War II.1 In the process, she tells a 
fascinating story of a gradual shift 
in trauma studies away from psy-
chodynamic theories that empha-
sized the subject’s uncontrollable 
mimetic identification with the ag-
gressor towards anti- psychoanalytic 
understandings of purely external 
stressors and traumatic images as 
the causes of trauma. In the book’s 
latter chapters, however, the focus 
shifts to a critique of recent work 
in affect theory, including a highly 
problematic reading of the work of 
the late queer theorist Eve Kosof-
sky Sedgwick. Leys interprets the 
work of Sedgwick “and her follow-
ers” not only as a further develop-
ment of the anti-psychoanalytic 
tendencies that have conspired to 
discredit the diagnosis of survivor 
guilt, but also as symptomatic of 
a larger, culturewide shift “from 
guilt to shame,” away from “ques-
tions of agency and responsibility” 
and towards what she misleadingly 
characterizes as a disengaged and 
solipsistic focus on identity. Since 
the publication of this book in 2007, 
Leys has continued to mount simi-
lar critiques, both of Sedgwick’s 
work and of the whole enterprise 
of shame-based affect theory. This 
review attempts to address that 
critique as it appears both in From 
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Guilt to Shame and in an interview 
and article that have appeared in 
the interim.2
First I should make it clear that 
Leys’s book does provide an im-
passioned, and I would say impor-
tant, defense of what she calls the 
mimetic school of trauma theory. 
In this way of thinking, traumatic 
experiences are marked and exac-
erbated by uncontrollable identi-
fication and merging with others, 
sometimes even the aggressor re-
sponsible for causing the trauma. 
The founding instability of the 
subject that this reflects is one of the 
most fundamental tenets of psy-
choanalysis, so it is easy to under-
stand why Leys, as a thinker with 
a strong psychoanalytic bent, might 
be critical of the attempt to replace 
it with antimimetic theories like 
that of Terrence Des Pres and oth-
ers for whom the cause of trauma 
is understood as entirely external to 
the subject and “uncontaminated 
by any mimetic, fictive, or fantas-
matic dimension” (15). The impor-
tance of survivor guilt to Leys has 
to do with the fact that we experi-
ence it over actions that occur only 
mimetically and in fantasy (like our 
“murderous” wish that someone 
else would die in our place), so it 
serves as a sort of proof of the mi-
metic theory of trauma. As she puts 
it, “[T]he concept of survivor guilt 
is inseparable from the notion of 
the subject’s unconscious identifica-
tion with the other” (10). Our abil-
ity to feel guilt over crimes we have 
not actually committed is a sign of 
the permeability of the subject and 
its vulnerability to immersive mi-
metic identification and the sway 
of fantasy. Another way of saying 
this would be that the notion of 
survivor guilt is incomprehensible 
without a psychoanalytic under-
standing of subjectivity. So the de-
nial of survivor guilt is tantamount 
to the repudiation of psychoanaly-
sis. One goal of Leys’s book, then, is 
to remind us of the psychoanalytic 
insight that we can think and desire 
things in our unconscious that we 
would find morally repugnant in 
our waking lives, but that this does 
not necessarily make us complicit 
with evil.
In chapter 4, however, which 
she describes as “arguably the heart 
of my book,” Leys moves into more 
problematic territory. Here “the 
theme of trauma . . . recedes,” and 
she draws a connection between 
the antimimetic critiques of survi-
vor guilt and contemporary shame 
theory, which she sees as having 
“taken the place” of survivor guilt, 
replacing its “intentionalist para-
digm” with an “anti-intentionalist” 
and “material” one (16). In Leys’s 
narrative, the rejection of survivor 
guilt gives rise to a culturewide 
preoccupation with shame as “a 
dominant emotional reference in 
the West” (4). She portrays this shift 
“from guilt to shame” in alarmist 
terms as a shift “away from ques-
tions of human agency” (150), 
leading to “an impulse to displace 
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questions about our moral respon-
sibility for what we do  in favor of 
more ethically neutral or different 
questions about our personal attri-
butes” (131; emphasis in original), 
and she predicts that the displace-
ment of guilt with shame will lead 
to a sort of narcissistic quietism that 
entails nothing less than “giving up 
disagreement about intention and 
meaning” (13).
This represents a crisis for Leys. 
But rather than discuss this sup-
posed shift in the same psycho-
analytic terms she used to critique 
antimimetic trauma theory, Leys 
resorts to decidedly unpsychoana-
lytic notions of individual agency 
and responsibility to sound her 
warning. Whereas in chapters 1–3 
she advocates a complex and rigor-
ously psychoanalytic understand-
ing of the psyche and critiques 
what she calls a “quasireligious idea 
of a conscience” (66) in the work 
of Terrence Des Pres and “more 
traditional notions of individual 
responsibility and consciousness” 
(14) in the work of Robert Lifton, 
in her treatment of shame theory 
in chapter 4 she seems almost to 
be channeling Des Pres and Lif-
ton, becoming herself a defender 
of moralistic notions of personal re-
sponsibility, agency, meaning, and 
intentionality. The question arises, 
why does Leys feel the need to por-
tray the recent upsurge in interest 
in shame as the consequence of the 
rejection of survivor guilt and to 
do so in such alarmist, moralizing 
terms that seem so at odds with her 
sophisticated psychoanalytic cri-
tique of antimimetic trauma theory 
in the book’s earlier chapters?
Shame Theory, Identity, 
Subjectivity
Despite Leys’s argument to the 
contrary, shame theory (especially 
Sedgwick’s) cannot be grouped 
alongside or seen as a logical devel-
opment of those antimimetic theo-
ries that see trauma as a “purely 
external event that befalls a fully 
constituted if passive subject” (9). 
Shame may be about “who one is” 
more than “what one does,” but 
that does not mean that shame the-
ory assumes the existence of a “fully 
constituted subject.” In Sedgwick’s 
work, shame is “not at all the place 
where identity is most securely at-
tached to essences, but rather . . . 
the place where the question of 
identity arises most originarily and 
most relationally.”3
Sedgwick is interested in iden-
tity and she sees shame as a crucial 
mechanism of its constitution, but 
this does not mean that she sees 
shame as an “attribute of person-
hood” (131) as Leys claims. The 
phrase “attribute of personhood” 
suggests a static understanding of 
the self that reverberates instead 
with Leys’s own condescending 
judgment of what she seems to 
see as the naïve identitarianism of 
shame theory (and implicitly of 
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queer theory). Leys’s work, in other 
words, is based on a fundamental 
misunderstanding of queer theory 
and the queer critique of identity. 
This is made very obvious early 
in chapter 4 when she describes 
Sedgwick’s work as being “focused 
on questions of queer identity, not 
trauma” (125). Anyone who has 
read any of Sedgwick’s work (see 
especially her classic essay “How to 
Bring Your Kids Up Gay”) knows 
that, for Sedgwick, (a) being queer 
does constitute trauma in a het-
eronormative society and (b) queer 
identity is an oxymoron since queer 
is a term invented precisely in order 
to critique and deconstruct identity.4
Queer theorists like Sedgwick 
might use the term queer to modify 
people now and then, but they are 
always careful to insist that queer-
ness does not designate any stable 
set of subjective experiences or any 
easily defined demographic group. 
Often Sedgwick put it in scare 
quotes to signal that it is far from a 
self-evident term, or even in paren-
theses and scare quotes in moments 
when she might seem to be suggest-
ing otherwise, as when she writes 
that “at least for certain (‘queer’) 
people shame is simply the first, 
and remains a permanent, structur-
ing fact of identity” (64).5 Needless 
to say, Sedgwick’s own position as a 
“straight” woman who considered 
herself queer made her exquisitely 
aware of the shifty malleability 
of the term. But Leys uses “queer 
identity” quite unproblematically 
as if it were a synonym for “gay” or 
“lesbian” identity. In the absence of 
any discussion of what exactly Leys 
herself means by “queer identity,” 
we are forced to assume that she 
sees queerness as another one of 
those (or perhaps even the proto-
typical) “personal attributes” that 
shame theorists want to focus on 
solipsistically.
It is remarkable that Leys says 
almost nothing about the context of 
Sedgwick’s work on shame. Leys 
does describe her as a queer theo-
rist but does little to explain how 
that might inform Sedgwick’s in-
terest in shame. At one point, Leys 
writes, “Normally we cannot be 
held responsible for who we are in 
the same way we can be held re-
sponsible for what we do—or what 
we imagine we have done” (131), 
after which she proceeds to explain 
how guilt and survivor guilt inevi-
tably entail questions of responsi-
bility and agency while shame is 
“the affect of disempowerment” 
(132). But this distinction between 
what you do and who you are is, in 
the case of queer theory, not at all 
one that can be taken for granted in 
the way that the word “normally” 
in this sentence so blithely suggests. 
As Sedgwick taught us long ago, 
the distinction between “conduct” 
and “status” is nothing less than a 
constitutive double bind for queer-
identified people. “Normal” people 
(the “we” of Leys’s sentence) may 
not be held responsible just for who 
they are, but minorities of all kinds 
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certainly have been and in many 
respects continue to be shamed for 
who they are. The oppression of 
queer-identified people derives its 
energy, moreover, not just from 
shame but from a constant “heads-
I-win–tails-you-lose” shifting back 
and forth between guilt and shame. 
This is made clear in the endless 
“nature vs. nurture” debates about 
what makes people gay, or lesbian, 
or transgender, or otherwise queer. 
If being queer is a choice, then 
you’re guilty for having made it. 
And if it’s a biological condition, 
then we ought to find a cure! If 
guilt is about “conduct” and shame 
is about “status,” it is the double 
bind between them that is espe-
cially relevant to the experience of 
queers. Or, rather, the specific way 
in which shame and guilt interact 
around queerness is itself consti-
tutive of the experience of being 
queer. So no wonder Sedgwick, as 
a queer theorist, was interested in 
joining this debate.
Leys writes that Sedgwick is 
interested in shame because it is 
a “technology for creating queer 
identity as the experience of pure 
difference” (154). This is a very 
extreme way of describing what 
is actually a very nuanced idea 
with which Sedgwick does smart 
and beautiful things in her writ-
ing, including the notion of the 
“nonce taxonomy” with its tension 
between unclassifiable uniqueness 
and rigorous systematicity.6 With 
the phrase “queer identity as the 
experience of pure difference,” 
however, Leys produces a carica-
ture of Sedgwick’s interest in dif-
ference, reducing it to the level of 
a simplistic fixation on “personal 
identity.” Sedgwick’s emphasis on 
the ways in which people are dif-
ferent from each other was never 
about passive resignation to the 
status quo or a navel-gazing inter-
est in “personal identity.” It was a 
way of combating a cultural order 
that she saw as aggressively, and 
sometimes murderously, enforc-
ing consensus and uniformity. Far 
from being a way to avoid conflict 
or ignore “meaning and intention,” 
it was a way to explore the most 
subtle and extreme forms of dif-
ference. This is not at all “ethically 
neutral.” It is the hard work of eth-
ics. Her interest in shame stemmed 
from a deep interest in what it feels 
like to be minoritized. And while 
she was really, truly, respectfully in-
terested in how people are different 
from each other, she also wanted 
to understand how the majority is 
constituted by exploiting, distort-
ing, and ignoring these differences.
Objectless Emotions
Another aspect of Sedgwick’s work 
that worries Leys is the way in 
which shame theory and other af-
fect theory supposedly strips the 
emotions of their “meaning” and 
their proper objects. For Sedgwick, 
following Silvan Tomkins, affects 
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are distinguished from the drives 
by their ability to attach to any kind 
of object. So while hunger, for ex-
ample, has food as its only object, 
interest, enjoyment, rage, or shame 
can be felt in relation to all kinds 
of objects, including other affects. 
This lack of an intrinsic connection 
between the affects and their objects 
means that they are much freer than 
the drives, and for both Sedgwick 
and Tomkins this is what accounts 
for the extraordinary richness and 
malleability of human motivation 
and experience. For Leys, however, 
this same freedom of the affects 
sounds impoverishingly arbitrary 
because it
makes it a delusion to say that 
you are happy because your 
child got a job, or sad because 
your mother died, for the 
simple reason that your child’s 
getting a job or your mother’s 
death are merely triggers for 
your happiness or sadness, 
which are themselves innate 
affect programs that could in 
principle be triggered by any-
thing else. (147)
This move is typical of Leys’s 
somewhat exaggerated rhetorical 
strategy. Just because there is no 
necessary connection between an 
affect and its object does not mean 
that there is no connection at all or 
that once that connection is formed 
it does not have any meaning or in-
tentionality. But be that as it may, in 
order to understand why this the-
ory of affects might be appealing to 
Sedgwick, we have to see her work 
within the context of the longer his-
tory of queer theory. In her interest 
in the freedom of the affects, Sedg-
wick is actually following the lead 
of Freud, who first decoupled the 
object from the “aim” of sexuality 
in his Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality (1905), arguing that they 
were not connected by any natural 
necessity, but “merely soldered to-
gether.”7 By denying any intrinsic 
connection between the aim and 
the object of the libido, Freud was 
able to denaturalize heterosexual-
ity, a crucial first step in the theo-
rization of sexuality. “From the 
point of view of psychoanalysis,” he 
wrote, “the exclusive sexual inter-
est felt by men for women is also a 
problem that needs elucidating and 
is not a self-evident fact based upon 
an attraction that is ultimately of a 
chemical nature.”8
The affects, of course, are even 
freer than the Freudian libido, 
which is one reason why affect 
theory is so appealing to Sedgwick. 
Leys follows Sedgwick up until 
this point, recognizing her appre-
ciation of the lack of instrumen-
tality and freedom of the affects 
as a way to critique the Freud-
ian repressive hypothesis, according 
to which all human behavior is 
to be explained by the pulsations 
of a single, end-oriented libidi-
nal drive. But she draws the line 
at Sedgwick and Tomkins’s claim 
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that this freedom of object choice 
also implies that the affects can be 
autotelic in nature. “I consider this 
a mistake,” she writes: “It doesn’t 
follow that because the affects can 
have a multiplicity—even a vast 
multiplicity—of objects they are 
inherently without any relation to 
objects whatsoever. The mistake, in 
other words, is thinking that hav-
ing multiple objects undoes objec-
tality altogether.” This is another 
huge leap. It is one thing to say that 
there is no inherent or intrinsically 
necessary relation between an affect 
and its object, or even that affects 
can be self-amplifying (hence auto-
telic), and quite another to say that 
this “undoes objectality altogether.” 
Leys puts the ostensibly disturbing 
conclusion to be drawn from this 
“mistake” in italics: “In short, for 
Tomkins and Sedgwick the affects are 
nonintentional states” (135).
It is by no means clear that Sedg-
wick and Tomkins would actually 
go so far as this. But it is clear that 
the idea make Leys very nervous. 
The nightmarish conclusion that 
she draws from it is that Sedgwick’s 
“theory of affect therefore appears 
to give primacy to the feelings of a 
subject without a psychology and 
without an external world” (148). 
For Leys, the idea that affects 
would not mean anything leads 
straight to a world where people 
are content just to feel their differ-
ences from one another rather than 
argue over them, where the univer-
sal and the true are eclipsed by the 
particular and the subjective, and 
the reader’s interpretation matters 
more than the author’s intention. 
In other words, she sees shame 
theory like that of Tomkins and 
Sedgwick as partaking in a (for her, 
dystopian) postmodern worldview. 
Not surprisingly, she cites Walter 
Benn Michaels here on the “end 
of history” and the “posthistoricist 
valuation of identity” and suggests 
that this is where Sedgwick’s work 
is leading us.9
I am not in a position to judge 
whether Leys’s claim that the work 
of Tomkins and others such as Paul 
Ekman on the universal and innate 
(rather than culturally determined 
and cognitively driven) nature of 
the affect system on which much of 
Sedgwick’s work is based is scien-
tifically inaccurate. It must be said, 
however, that for Sedgwick it mat-
ters much less whether it is right 
or wrong than whether it is use-
ful and productive as a theoretical 
 paradigm—whether it is “good to 
think with.” As Leys also points out, 
Sedgwick is quite open about her 
own position on this. She called it
moving from the rather fix-
ated question Is a particular 
piece of knowledge true? 
and how can we know? to 
the further questions: What 
does knowledge do?—the 
pursuit of it, the having and 
exposing of it, the receiving 
again of knowledge one al-
ready knows? How, in short, 
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is knowledge performa-
tive, and how best does one 
move among its causes and 
effects?10
It may be simply that the per-
formative effect and value of af-
fect theory in the context of literary 
studies, where it is not in the major-
ity, is different from its effect and 
value in the context of psychology, 
where it is. Leys wants to back up 
her own position with the author-
ity of scientific proof when in fact 
it seems that she herself may be 
motivated to defend the guilt side 
because she prefers to “think with 
guilt.” Rather than being up front 
about this, however, she appeals to 
the authority of science.
* * *
But what is really a shame about 
Leys’s book is its refusal to en-
gage with shame theory, especially 
queer shame theory on its own 
terms. She is so intent on recount-
ing her own narrative of cultural 
decline from guilt to shame that 
she misses almost everything that 
is valuable about what these writ-
ers are doing. One has the sense in 
reading her work that she is simply 
not interested in it. In a recent in-
terview, she was asked a question 
that, despite its potentially ominous 
implications, might actually have 
led in a productive direction. That 
question was “How would your 
emphasis on guilt alter our un-
derstanding of the construction of 
queer identity?” Leys responds by 
saying, “[A]t least it would make 
questions of meaning and agency 
of central interest because . . . guilt 
is tied to the question of one’s (real 
or imagined) intentions to act in a 
certain way, whereas shame shifts 
attention from questions of agency 
and meaning to questions of per-
sonal identity.”11
It is hard to determine precisely 
what Leys is suggesting here, al-
though one might be forgiven for 
thinking that she is saying that 
queers are somehow evading re-
sponsibility (for their queerness?) 
by focusing too much on shame 
and too little on guilt. And yet she 
hastens to add that she is not com-
pletely rejecting the “relevance of 
shame” either. She assures us later 
in the same paragraph that “noth-
ing I say critically about shame the-
ory today is meant to reject the view 
that shame may be an appropri-
ate response to certain situations.” 
The wording here is nothing short 
of  bizarre—as if the question ever 
was, or ever could be, whether or 
not shame was appropriate.
For myself, as a queer theorist 
and a scholar of Japanese literature, 
I cannot help but be reminded in 
reading Leys’s work of the tired 
and (one thought) discredited ar-
guments that anthropologists used 
to make about so-called shame cul-
ture versus guilt culture. This argu-
ment, which formed the backbone 
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of one of the most devastating 
forms of Western Orientalism, was 
most famously put forth in Ruth 
Benedict’s wartime book The Chry-
santhemum and the Sword (1946), a 
work that, as Marylin Ivy has re-
cently put it, “produced Japan as a 
‘shame culture’ for American de-
lectation.” Benedict argued (with-
out ever visiting Japan) that the 
Japanese had no sense of self strong 
enough to experience guilt—the 
latter being the hallmark of more 
“advanced” Western cultures. As 
Ivy puts it, in Benedict’s book,
Ashamed, shame appears as 
less developed, less autono-
mous, less evolved than guilt. 
Shame is felt always in rela-
tion to the Other, unlike guilt 
with its sturdy, consistent 
standards of morality (guilt is 
confessable). Shame is more 
primitive. Shame allows the 
most heinous deeds, and all is 
well, as long as these crimes 
are not exposed to the gaze 
of the world. Guilt does not 
depend on crime’s revelation. 
Guilt is internalized, autono-
mous; shame is external-
ized, heteronomous. Guilt 
is fixed; shame is mutable. 
Guilt is American; shame is 
Japanese.12
Leys herself cites Benedict’s work 
and the notion of shame cultures 
completely uncritically at the be-
ginning of chapter 4, which tells 
the alarming story of what she calls 
“shame’s revival.”13 So for Leys, it 
would seem, we are all in danger 
of turning Japanese. But it is simply 
wrong to characterize the rise of an 
interest in shame among queer-af-
fect theorists as what Leys describes 
as “a means of avoiding the moral-
isms associated with the notion 
of guilt.” This makes it sound as 
though “Sedgwick and others” are 
somehow trying to get away with 
something that is morally suspect. 
In my view, and I think in Sedg-
wick’s, guilt and shame are not so 
easily separated, and certainly not 
useful in isolation as descriptors ei-
ther of entire cultures or whole his-
torical moments, be they Japanese 
or queer, then or now.
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